Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1972

Mariani Air Products Company v. Gill's Tire
Market : Appellant's Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Dwight L. King; Attorney for Defendant and AppellantNathan J.
Fullmer; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Mariani Air Products v. Gill's Tire Market, No. 12992 (Utah Supreme Court, 1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3271

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE
OF THE
MARIANI Ailt
COMPANY,

VI •

.,~ ...

.·r::~·._,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE---------------------------------------- 1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------------------- 2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------------------- 2
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6
POINT I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE LEASE TERMINATED ON APRIL 28, 1971 ------------------------------------ 6
POINT II.
MARIANI WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RENT
UNTIL THE ROOF LEAK AND DAMAGE
CAUSED BY IT WERE REPAIRED-------------------------- 9
CONCLUSION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------13

CASES CITED
Bostwich v. Losey,
67 Mich. 554, 35 NW 246 ----------------------------------------------------11
Broadhurst v. Whitelock,
313 F.2d 130 (C.A. Utah) ------------------------------------------------ 8
Hodges Irrigation Co. v. Swan Creek Canal Co.,
111 Utah 405, 181 P.2d 217 --------------------------------·----·---------- 7
Mayer v. Rothstein,
167 N. Y.S. 503 --------------------------------------------------------------------10
Mitchell v. Weiss,
(Texas C.A.), 26 S.W.2d 699 --------------------------------------------10
Timmons v. McKenzie,
21 Ariz . 433 ' 189 P. 627 ----------------------------------------------------10

TEXTS CITED
36 Corpus Juris, P. 167, Section 801, Note 15-16____________________ 10
51 C.J.S., P. 997, Section 373 (5), Note 43 ____________________________ 10

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARIANI AIR PRODUCTS
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case
No.
12992

GILL'S TIRE MARKET,
Defendant and
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This case was tried to the Court before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson and involves a claim by
plaintiff against defendant for unpaid rent. Defendant's answer was that the premises had been
repossessed by plaintiff, that the repossession was not
objected to by defendant but effectively terminated
the lease and obligation of defendant to pay rent.
Defendant also defended upon the ground that the
plaintiff violated the lease agreement in failing to
keep the roof in a reasonable state of repair, permitting the premises to become uninhabitable as a result
of roof leakage into the retail section of the store.
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Following trial, Court entered judgment against the
defendant, rejecting its defenses, and ordered rent to
be paid for the full lease term, with judgment in the
amount of $1,800.00 together with attorney's fees in
the amount of $+68.33.
From this judgment the defendant prosecuted
its appeal.
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
Judgment ordered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant follovving trial in the amount of
$1,800.00 back rent, $468.33 attorney's fees, and
$+5.50 costs were entered by the Trial Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Trial Court
judgment upon the ground and for the reason that
as a matter of law on the uncontradicted evidence no
rent was O\ving by defendant and no attorney's fees
\Vere proper.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The agreement between the parties is in writing
and is Exhibit 1-P, a lease dated the 16th day of
l\1arch, 19 70.

It covers the premises located at 6+8 South First
\Vest in Salt Lake City, Utah, and provided for rent
at the rate of $300.00 per month.
The lease anticipated the operation on the
premises by the lessee of a tire business and \vas
2

actually used for wholesale and retail operations during the time when the premises were fully used.
The provision of the lease which, it is defendant's
claim, was violated by plaintiff is the replacement
paragraph for paragraph 4 in writing and attached
to the lease which provides as follows:
"Lessor agrees to maintain the roof of the
building located on said premises during the
term of this lease, except for any repairs as
may be required as a result of improvements
ocr remodeling of said premises by Lessee or
damage to the roof resulting from the acts
and conduct of Lessee or others in connection
with Lessee's occupancy of the premises."
See Exhibit 1-P attachment.
On the roof of the premises, the Lessor had
installed a swamp cooler prior to the time of the
lease. Exhibit 10-P shows the swamp cooler sitting
on the roof of the building.
Prior to the 28th of January, defendant's employees discovered that there was a leak in the roof
and water had run down on the inside of the building
and had caused substantial damage to the section
occupied by defendant for its retail outlet. (R. page
40) On January 28, 1971 the manager of plaintiff
and an employee of defendant met on the premises
and examined the damage done by the leak in the
roof. Witnesses Alvey for defendant and Mohr for
plaintiff both agree that as a result of said conference
Mohr, representing plaintiff, agreed to repair the
roof and to do the repairs necessary to replace the
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damaged wallpaper and paint in the room used by
defendant for a retail outlet. This basic understanding is shown by the testimony of Mohr, pages 40
through 42 of the record. Attempts were made by
plaintiff to do the repair work on occasions when the
premises were not open for business and after hours,
but Alvey, representing defendant, would not permit
this since there was valuable tires stored on the
premises and security could not be maintained if
after hours work was accomplished CR. 42). No
repair work was ever done by the plaintiff other than
the leak in the roof was repaired and the water which
apparently was leaking from the swamp cooler down
through the roof was stopped. When the premises
were re-rented, plaintiff then allowed the new tenant
$700.00 against the cost of repairing the area damaged by the water. CR.43).
It appeared clear that the water leaked out of the
swamp cooler on to the roof of the building, and then
through the roof of the building into the area occupied
by defendant CR. 47, R. 50, R. 93). Defendant's testimony, which is uncontradicted, from witness Alvey
was that the damage to the interior of the building
from the leak through the roof made the sales office
unusable CR. 52). After the discussion with Mohr,
manager of plaintiff, defendant did not attempt to
make the repairs but waited for these to be accomplished by plaintiff's organization CR. 52). The only
attempt to do the repairs was to arrange for after
hour workers to be in the premises, which the defendant could not permit since security could not be main4

tained (R. 53). Jay Gill, president 0£ defendant,
described the damage done and testified that the damage was so extensive that the area could not be used
as a retail tire outlet (R. 57). This testimony by
defendant's witnesses was uncontradicted, as was the
testimony that $700.00 was the reasonable appraisal
for the damages allowed by plaintiff.
It was stipulated by counsel for the parties that
defendant had paid 12 months rent which would
be through the month of March, 1971, and that six
months rent would be all that could be claimed for
the period of April, 1971 through September, 1971.
( R. 31 ) . The following facts are established, defendant believes, as uncontradicted and undisputed.
( 1) That the plaintiff retained the responsibility for
repairing the roof of the premises; (2) That the roof
leaked and caused damage to the interior of the
premises in December or early January of 1970 and
1971; (3) That the plaintiff ascertained the damage
and agreed to repair the roof and the damage done
to the interior of the building; (4) That the roof was
not repaired nor the damage repaired to the interior
of the building at any time while the defendant's
lease was in effect; ( 5) That the cost of repair was
$700.00; (6) That the damage made the premises
uninhabitable for a retail sales outlet; ( 7) On April
28, 1971 Mariani, owner of plaintiff, picked up the
key to the premises from Gill, owner of defendant,
and retained the key from that time on, which was
defendant's only means of access to the inside of the
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building CR. 85, R. 78); (8) No use was made of the
building by defendant after April 28, 1971.
Plaintiff testified that repeated efforts were made
to contact Gill and promises were made to return
the key to him, but neither one of these events occurred following the visit on April 28, 1971 by Mariani
and Gill to the premises, at which time Mariani
picked up Gill's key to the building.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE LEASE TERMINATED ON APRIL 28, 1971.
It is defendant's position, based on the uncontradicted evidence and the undisputed stipulations and
agreement as to what had occurred, that effective the
28th of April, 1971 defendant no longer owed rent
to the plaintiff and plaintiff had repossessed and taken
back the property which had been theretofore under
lease to defendant.
The uncontradicted evidence is that Mariani
picked up the key, which was the only means of
access that defendant had to the premises, on April
28 and retained it from that time on. He testified he
made efforts to return the key but was never
successful.
The conduct of the parties as far as it relates to
the interpretation of a contract has universely been
held to be the highest evidence of their intentions.
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This Court, in Hodges Irrigation Co. v. Swan Creek
Canal Co,., 111Utah405,181 P.2d217,recitedand
followed this universal rule. Where a party, by his
conduct, interprets the contract and the other party
relies on the interpretation, the real meaning of the
agreement is found.
Here there was independent practical construction by Mariani, accepted by Gill. The act of taking
the key was intentionally and conclusively engaged
in by Mariani and accepted by Gill.
Gill made no attempt to return to possession or
repair the premises. The correspondence between the
attorneys for Mariani and Gill shows that the key to
the premises was a matter that all knew was important. Gill's testimony is not contradicted where he
testified that if the key was returned and the premises
fixed up so that they could be habitable, he would pay
the rent. Neither one of these conditions was ever
met.

In Hodges Irrigation Co. v. Swan Creek Canal
Co., supra, this Court stated the rule which defendant
asserts is applicable:
"Here appellant from the time of the removal
of the flume controverted respondent's interpretation. True there were some acceptances
by some of appellant's secretaries of the $6
proferred by respondent in its settlement of
accounts but such acceptances are just as consistent with the theory that since respondent
refused to pay more they took what they
could get as it is with the contention that
appellant interpreted the contract in the same
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manner as respondent, and in view of the fact
that appellant has since the removal of the
flume tried to get respondent to pay an equal
share of the expenses incurred, it is probable
that the reason of such acceptances of the $6
was inability to collect more rather than an
indication of a practical interpretation of the
contract. As stated in 17 C.J .S., Contracts,
Sec. 325, subdiv. b, page 764:
'To warrant the court in according great
weight to, or adopting, a practical construction by the parties, it is necessary
and sufficient that each party shall have
placed the same construction on the contract. While the construction placed by
one party on his own intention, the meaning of the contract cannot be established
by the construction placed on it by one of
the parties, unless such interpretation has
been made to and relied on by the other
party, or has been known to and
acquiesced in by the other party, * * *.' "
The Tenth Circuit has also expressed itself on the
rule of contract interpretation in Broadhurst v.
Whitelock, 313 F. 2d 130 CC.A. Utah), it stated,
page 316:
"This contract was drafted by one of the parties
and changed by the other; the trial court
sought out the intent from the particular
wording, from the whole document, from the
general circumstances, and from the acts of
the parties."
* * * * * * * * *
"Thus the action of the parties and their associates in the handling of the claims served to
place an interpretation on the agreements by
8

the parties, and this interpretation is consistent with the trial court's findings and
conclusions.''
Defendant respectfully submits that the conduct
of Mariani conclusively shows that he did not intend
to fix up the premises so they would be habitable. The
premises were not fixed up. Gill could not use the
building in the way that it wished. Mariani's conduct, it is defendant's position, is, as a matter of law,
a termination of the lease on April 28, 1971. No rent
thereafter would be due and owing and the judgment
of the Court should have been for one month's rent
only for the period ending April 28, 1971, a sum of

$300.00.

POINT II
MARIANI WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RENT
UNTIL THE ROOF LEAK AND DAMAGE
CAUSED BY IT WERE REPAIRED.
It is uncontradicted in all of the evidence that
the premises leased to Gill were damaged through a
leak in the roof CR. 47-50-93).

It is uncontradicted that plaintiff accepted the
responsibility for repairing the roof and the damage
which the leak had caused to the interior of the building CR. 42).
It is further uncontradicted that the damage to
the retail area in the building made it unfit for use
by defendant. Defendant, however, continued to pay
the rent up through the month of March, and it is
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stated in the letter from Attorney Fullmer, first failed
to pay additional rent April 20, 1971.
It has always been the rule of law that where
a tenant is deprived of the use of the premises by the
failure of the landlord to repair, the tenant is entitled
to recover the rent paid for the period in question or
to offset it against the balance of the rent owing. See
Timmons v. McKenzie, 21 Ariz. 433, 189 P. 627;
Mayer v. Rothstein, 167 N.Y.S. 503; 36 Corpus Juris,
P. 167, Section 801, Note 15-16; 51 C.J.S., P. 997,
Section 373 (5), Note 43.
Perhaps the best and most succinct exposition
of the law is in Mitchell v. Weiss, Texas C.A., 26 S.W.
2d 699. There the Court stated the rule in the following language:
"The proper measure of damages varies with
the facts of the particular case. In some cases
it is regarded that the tenant, being in possession, should make the repairs when the
landlord fails to do so, and the measure of
damages in such a case is the reasonable cost
of the repairs. 1 Sedgwick on Damages (9th
Ed.) Sec. 209.
The usual measure applied is the reduced
rental value; that is, the difference between
the contract rental and the rental value in the
unrepaired condition. 35 C.J. 1191.
The present case is not one where the
landlord has wholly breached his covenant
to repair. At most the breach is but partial by
failing to restore one of the buildings to as
good condition as it was just before the fire.
The tenant has not been disturbed in his
10

possession of the buildings except in one of
them, and then only during the brief period
the repairs were being made. This interruption was of course authorized. The proper
measure of the tenant's damage in this case
is the reduced rental value, if any, as indicated above."
In a case somewhat similar in legal significance
to the case at bar, Bostwich v. Losey, 67 Mich. 554,
35 NW 246, the Michigan Supreme Court set down
the rule which the defendant seeks to have this Court
apply, namely that there is no rent due and owing
after failure of the plaintiff to make the repairs which
it covenanted to make and after failure to put the
premises back in a usable and habitable condition.
See 248 NW Rept.
"What the defendants contracted for was the
use of the saw-mill, and the saw-mill was
dependent in its use upon the water-power
which propelled it. The plaintiff covenanted
to keep the flumes, through which the water
passed to the mill, in repair. If he neglected
or refused to do this when notified, and on
account of such neglect the water-power was
destroyed, and the mill thereby rendered useless to the defendants, the consideration of
the agreement or lease failed, and the defendants were justified in abandoning the
premises, and the stipulated rent could not
be recovered after such failure of consideration. Tyler v. Disbrow, 40 Mich. 415; Landi.
& Ten. Sec. 377; Hinckley v. Beckwith, 13
Wis. 34. Nor were the defendants bound to
make the repairs themselves. It was the duty
of plaintiff, under the agreement, to make
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these repairs, without which the premises
were of but little or no value for the use
defendants required, and to which they were
entitled under the contract. The defendants
had the right to hold the plaintiff to the
ordinary responsibility of a party failing to
perform his agreement, to-wit, to pay the
damages caused by such failure. We can see
no difference in this respect between this and
any other contract. Hinckley v. Beckwith, 13
Wis. 31, 17 Wis. 426; Myers v. Burns, 35 N.Y.
269; Hexter v. Knox, 63 N.Y. 561.
The conduct of the parties, defendant submits,
is most important and conclusive on the Court in
interpreting the meaning and responsibilities that
each party undertook.
Plaintiff never did, even after it obtained the
key and had free access to the building, repair the
damage which had been caused by the leak in the
roof. It never did place the premises back in a usable
and habitable condition for the purposes which
defendanted rented. No work was ever done to
restore the premises by plaintiff. When it entered
into an agreement to release them, it gave to the new
tenant a $700.00 consideration and permitted the
new tenant to make the repairs that were necessary
to place the premises in a habitable condition. (R. 42,
testimony of Mohr, manager of plaintiff).
The position of defendant is not based on contradictory evidence as the evidence was relatively free
of conflict on the crucial issues which defendant submits are determinative of the parties' rights. It is
12

respectfully submitted as a matter of law that the
Trial Court erred in granting judgment against the
defendant for the rent for the whole term, including
attorney's fees, and that this Court should reverse ·
the Trial Court since the evidence is undisputed and
order judgment in accordance with the legal rights of
the parties as determined by the Court.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of
the Trial Court should be reversed and that this Court
should determine the rights of the parties and order
judgment entered in accordance with the law and as
it pertains to landlord and tenant.
Respectfully submitted this -------------------- day of
·-··-·--------------------------, 1972.
DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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